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Leading While Catching Up?:
Emerging Standards for China’s Overseas Investments
by Kirk Herbertson*

I

Introduction

n February 2011, activists marched across Nairobi, Kenya
to the Chinese embassy waving banners and chanting “haki
yetu!” (our right!).1 They demanded that the Chinese government end Chinese companies’ involvement in construction
of the Gibe 3 dam, Ethiopia’s largest ever public infrastructure
project.2 The activists had previously petitioned the Chinese
government, Chinese companies, the Kenyan government, and
Ethiopian government, but received no response.3 The march
symbolized people’s frustration in being unable to communicate
with the Chinese companies involved in the project.4
The Gibe 3 dam will span across the Omo River in Ethiopia, which flows into Lake Turkana on the southern border with
Kenya.5 When completed in 2012, the dam will reduce the Omo
River’s flow by thirty percent, affecting the 500,000 local people
who depend on the lake and river for their livelihoods.6 The Lake
Turkana region is already a landscape in crisis. According to
several independent studies, the reduced water flow could lead
to food insecurity, intensify pre-existing tribal conflicts in the
area, and potentially destabilize the region near the Ethiopian,
Kenyan, and Sudanese borders.7 The Gibe 3 dam is one of five
large hydropower projects underway in Ethiopia.8 More dams
are planned as the Ethiopian government has decided to export
electricity to neighboring countries (although agreements have
not yet been reached with these countries).9 When the dam’s reservoir is filled, over 100,000 people will need to relocate to grow
crops.10 Hundreds of thousands of others may lose their livelihoods from herding, fishing, and trading.11
Many foreign investors declined to finance the project. In
2008, JPMorgan Chase decided not to underwrite the project,
and by 2010 the World Bank, African Development Bank, and
European Investment Bank also withdrew funding considerations.12 In July 2010, however, the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (“ICBC,” the world’s largest bank) agreed to
become the project’s largest lender, granting a loan of $500 million to a Chinese company to provide equipment necessary to
construct the dam.13
The Gibe 3 dam project is one example of how China’s
overseas investments have gained international media attention
in recent years. China’s decades-long growth has made it the second largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan in mid-2010
and soon to eclipse the United States.14 As China’s economy
grows, so does its demand for natural resources and new markets.15 The Chinese government has shaped its foreign policy to
keep up with demand for energy and resources by encouraging
companies to “go global.”
Spring 2011

From a macroeconomic perspective, the results have been
impressive. Overseas investments have tapped natural resources
ranging from minerals and oil in Africa, to hydropower in Southeast Asia.16 New markets have opened for Chinese goods and
services.17 Many Chinese companies have found particularly
lucrative opportunities in impoverished, resource-rich developing countries.18 In 2010, China became Africa’s largest trading
partner.19 Yet at the same time, many people have expressed
concern about the environmental and human rights footprint of
these investments.20
This article provides a brief overview of efforts underway
to strengthen environmental and social sustainability in China’s
overseas investments. In recent years, the Chinese government
and several companies have recognized the importance of ensuring that investments are responsible, and have begun to adopt
standards that govern overseas investments. The article first provides a brief overview of China’s approach to overseas investments, using examples from Africa. The article then describes
how Western and multilateral financial institutions have traditionally played a role in promoting environmentally and socially
responsible investments, and considers whether Chinese financial institutions could play a similar role. This article will also
examine the environmental and social standards that are emerging for China’s overseas investments.

China’s Approach to Overseas Investments
In 2001, China’s tenth Five-Year Plan21 directed Chinese
companies to “go global,” as a way to gain access to natural
resources, stimulate China’s exports, and build China’s markets
abroad.22 The Chinese government, in turn, provided support
to companies, including access to finance, tax exemptions, and
insurance to lower the costs of doing business.23 As a result of
the “go global” Strategy, China’s foreign direct investment flows
increased from less than one billion dollars in 2000 to an estimated fifty-five billion dollars in the first half of 2010 alone.24
As early as 1954, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai announced
the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” that continue to
set the parameters for China’s approach to international development: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
(2) mutual non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other’s
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internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful
coexistence.25
Based on these principles, the Chinese government has
branded Chinese overseas investment as a “new type” of strategic partnership for developing countries that differs from
Western aid and investment.26 China’s overseas investments are
closely linked to its development aid—both are important parts
of the loan packages that the Chinese government often negotiates with host governments. The Chinese government encourages “win-win” development, guarantees non-interference in
domestic affairs, and promises not to condition the receipt of
aid on governance and democratic reforms.27 Often, Chinese aid
comes in the form of infrastructure projects that are built by Chinese companies.

Natural Resource Extraction in Africa
Like many Western investments, a significant portion of
China’s investments in Africa focus on natural resource extraction. Over fifty percent of all foreign direct investment inside
Africa goes towards natural resource exploitation.28 Over one
quarter of U.S. and Chinese imports come from major African
oil exporting countries—Nigeria, Angola, and Algeria for the
United States and Angola, Sudan, and Libya for China.29 Since
2000, the number of oil companies operating in Africa (both
private and state-owned) has increased from 250 to over 800.30
Competition to exploit Africa’s natural resources is growing.31
Chinese oil companies remain relatively small players in
Africa, providing only eight percent of the combined commercial value of international oil companies’ investments in Africa.32
Due to intense competition, Chinese companies have often
invested in developing countries with weak governance systems,
political instability, and high levels of corruption.33 Many companies—both Western and Chinese—have come under criticism
for their environmental and human rights records in Africa.34 In
this sense, China’s interest in Africa’s natural resources is not
unique but often receives media attention because of its highrisk approach.

Challenges in Protecting the Environment and
Human Rights
While Chinese companies are not unique in their interest
in Africa’s natural resources, their approach often differs from
Western counterparts. This poses distinct challenges in upholding environmental and human rights protections.
Chinese aid often takes the form of turn-key projects—
financed and built entirely by Chinese companies, and then
turned over to the host government with technical assistance.
These projects focus overwhelmingly (but not always) on concrete infrastructure projects such as roads and dams.35 After the
civil war ended in Angola in 2002, for example, China was one
of the first countries to provide development assistance.36 With
Chinese support, Angola initiated over one hundred projects in
energy, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries,
and public works.37 Many of these projects involved construction of new infrastructure.
23

The relationship between China and Angola is complex, but
several elements are revealing about the nature of China’s overseas investments:38
• The Chinese government worked directly with Angola’s
president. In 2006, the president described the relationship as “mutually advantageous,” “pragmatic,” and with
“no political preconditions.”39 Cooperation is characterized
by frequent bilateral visits of important state officials, and
signing of various agreements. In these high-level negotiations, there was little accountability to the public or efforts
to respond to public concerns.40
• Bilateral trade increased rapidly in a few years time. Crude
oil was the main Angola export to China, and imports from
China also increased—including steel, cement, autos, and
batteries.41 China was a major source of foreign direct
investment, especially through the entry of Chinese construction firms.42
• Although China received the most media attention, it was not
the only actor. Angola also had investment agreements with
India, Brazil, South Africa, and others that have increased in
volume.43 Over time, other donors have expressed a willingness to extend credit lines to Angola.44
• China’s loans to Angola were backed by oil revenue. In 2004,
China Export Import Bank pledged a two billion dollar oilbacked loan to Angola to fund reconstruction of infrastructure.45 For each project, the Chinese government proposed a
few Chinese companies.46 Repayment began as soon as the
project was completed.47 Revenue from oil was deposited in
an escrow account, from which the amount for servicing the
debt was deducted.48 The Government of Angola was then
free to use the remainder at its own discretion.49 Loans were
provided at a deeply concessional rate (LIBOR +1.5%).50
• Chinese laborers remained separate from the local population. Chinese laborers typically stayed in Angola for one
or two year contracts, often living in closed compounds
near the construction site.51 There was little contact with
Angolans.52 At the same time, a growing number of Chinese entrepreneurs entered Angola.53 Communication challenges existed due to cultural differences and language
barriers, and most businesses remained separate from local
communities.54
• Corporate social responsibility was not part of the business
plan. Chinese companies did not interact with local communities or civil society organizations, and did not discuss
environmental and human rights concerns openly.55 In general, Chinese companies did not keep local communities
informed of operations.56

Using Finance to Hold Companies
Accountable for Overseas Impacts
Civil society activists have long struggled to find ways to
hold companies accountable for the environmental and human
rights impacts of their overseas operations. Traditionally, the laws
of the United States and other major investor countries do not
apply overseas.57 One important approach, developed over the
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past two decades by activists, has been to follow the money—to
ensure that companies and governments only receive financing
for projects that are environmentally and socially responsible.58
Many, but not all companies rely on financing to pursue
large-scale overseas investments. When companies seek financing from investors, they often must prove that the investment
is likely to generate a return. This includes identifying risks to
the project’s success and demonstrating that these risks can be
mitigated.59
Increasingly, companies acknowledge that environmental
and human rights risks can harm the success of a development
project (see Box 1).60 Harm to communities can lead to protests
that block or delay construction, and can motivate governments
to alter licenses, permits, and oversight of projects. Local and
international civil society campaigns can also damage the reputations of companies and financial institutions involved, affecting share prices and the implementation of related projects.61
Box 1: Environmental and Social Risks62
When investing in developing countries, companies increasingly consider the ways that harm to the environment and
local communities can affect a project. The following are
examples of risks that can arise out of environmental and
human rights harms.
Financing risk – Financial institutions and investors may
delay their financing, require more conditions, or decide not
to participate.
Construction risk – The proponent may not be able to complete the project on time or on budget.
Operational risk – The proponent may not be able to access
necessary inputs, produce sufficient output, or sell at a sufficient price, which can disrupt operations.
Reputational risk – The project may harm the proponent’s or
financial institutions’ brand identity, which can translate into
loss of market value.
Corporate risk – Delays or interruptions to a project may
reduce the proponent’s profitability and asset values, decreasing the proponent’s stock value, lowering its credit rating, and
raising the cost of borrowing.
Host government risk – The host government may withdraw permits and licenses, commence enforcement actions,
impose civil or criminal penalties on the proponent, or tighten
requirements.
Host country political risk – Political forces in the host
country may threaten the project.
As a result, managing environmental and human rights risks
is not just goodwill, but good business. Many studies show how
safeguarding against these risks can help to manage the complex
impacts of development projects.63 For example, engaging local
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communities in the design of a project can help build community
support for the project and avoid conflict later in the project cycle.64

Environmental and Social Standards of Financial
Institutions
In response to public criticism of its involvement in controversial projects in the 1980s and 1990s—such as the Narmada
Dam in India, which displaced over 300,000 people—the World
Bank developed “safeguard” policies to help identify, avoid, and
minimize harm to people and the environment.65 These policies
require borrowing governments to follow risk mitigation procedures in order to receive Bank financing.66 Examples of these
procedures include conducting an environmental and social
impact assessment, consulting with local communities, and
restoring the livelihoods of displaced people.67
Since that time, other financial institutions have adopted
similar policies.68 The International Finance Corporation
(“IFC”)—the private sector financing arm of the World Bank
Group—developed a detailed set of environmental and social
standards in 2006.69 Over sixty private financial institutions have
adopted the IFC’s standards through the Equator Principles.70
These policies are constantly evolving. In 2011, for example, the
IFC will adopt an updated version of its standards.71
Although these standards are far from perfect and have not
always successfully prevented harmful investments from going
forward,72 they have become an important pillar of environmental and human rights protections in overseas investments.

A Role for Chinese Banks in
Sustainable Development?
Is there a role for Chinese banks to promote environmentally and socially responsible overseas investments? In the past
few years, both the Chinese government and several Chinese
financial institutions have recognized the importance of environmental and social standards.73 Efforts are now underway to
develop these standards in the Chinese context.74
China’s financial sector has the potential to play an influential role in strengthening the environmental and social performance of China’s overseas investments. Because many Chinese
companies do not raise funds in the capital markets, the majority of total capital available to Chinese industry comes from
financial institutions.75 Over the past five years, in response to
concern about the massive pollution that accompanies China’s
rapid growth, the Chinese government has begun to apply “green
credit” policies to domestic lending.76 Chinese officials have
also worked closely with international financial institutions, particularly the IFC, to build capacity of Chinese financial institutions to manage environmental and social risks.77 While still in
their early years, China’s “green credit” policy has demonstrated
measurable success.78

Government Influence Over Overseas Investments
While the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese companies to “go global,” these companies are not merely arms of the
central government; many companies are encouraged to act autonomously.79 For example, many Chinese national oil companies,
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are partially owned and controlled by the government,80 but have
gained influence due to surging profits, listing on foreign stock
exchanges, and relationships with international investors.81 Significant profits from years of high oil prices have also enabled
Chinese oil companies to finance their own investments, rather
than relying solely on Chinese financial institutions.
Nevertheless, the government continues to provide financial
support to these companies to help them compete against established
international oil companies.82 In particular, Chinese banks play a
prominent role in large acquisitions and investments and in negotiations with host governments.83 As many Chinese companies interact
at least to a certain extent with Chinese banks, their influence over
environmental and social standards could continue to grow.

Key Banks in China’s Overseas Investments
Although China’s largest private and state-owned banks
often invest overseas, China’s state-owned “policy banks” are
the leading financial actors behind the “go global” strategy.84
The two primary banks that support overseas investments are
the Export Import Bank of China (“China ExIm”) and the China
Development Bank (“CDB”).85
Most major economies have “export credit agencies”
that help to finance companies exporting goods and services
abroad.86 China ExIm is one of the largest export credit agencies
in the world.87 In 2009, ExIm and CBD combined approved over
one hundred and ten billion dollars in lending.88 Founded as a
policy bank, and now a semi-private bank, China Development
Bank has also been one of the key funders of large infrastructure
and industrial projects overseas.89
As Deborah Brautigam of American University describes:
The importance of policy banks like the ExIm Bank and
China Development Bank in China’s development model
and its international economic relations cannot be emphasized too strongly. China . . . is in many ways a typical East
Asian developmental state. It acts to accelerate development
through deliberate use of state policies. The central characteristic of a developmental state is its control over finance.
This control need not be exclusive – but it must be important
at the margin in order to influence the behavior of firms in
directions determined by political leaders. In this regard, Beijing is following directly in the footsteps of the earlier Asian
successes, Japan, Korean, and Taiwan, who all used development finance to “pick winners” in the globalization race.90
In the next five years, we can expect these financial institutions to play an increasingly important role in encouraging Chinese companies towards environmentally and socially responsible
investments. In March 2011, the National Peoples’ Congress met
in Beijing to approve the next Five-Year Plan.91 At the core of this
plan are environmental protection and social equity.92

Emerging Standards in China’s
Overseas Investments
Standards are already emerging that could influence China’s
overseas investments. These include domestic policies, voluntary corporate standards, and policies designed specifically for
overseas investments.
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Domestic Policies
For several years, Chinese financial institutions have pursued “green credit” policies in their domestic lending.93 In 2003,
China adopted a stronger environmental impact assessment law
that ensures greater public participation in project decisionmaking.94 In 2007, the State Environmental Protection Agency
(now the Ministry of Environment), Peoples’ Bank of China, and
Central Banking Regulatory Commission issued a green credit
policy that requires all commercial banks to conduct environmental screening of loans, and to restrict lending to companies
with high energy consumption and pollution.95 The policy also
established a credit blacklist that prohibits banks from lending
to companies that fail to meet environmental standards. The
Chinese government followed the Green Credit Policy with a
Green Trade Policy (2007), Green Securities Policy (2008), and
a Green Insurance Policy (2008).96 In 2008, the government took
measures to increase public access to environmental information
from the government and companies.97 These experiences may
help to inform future standards for China’s overseas investments.

Voluntary Corporate Standards
In 2008, President Hu Jintao announced that companies
should establish the concept of global responsibility,
include social responsibility in their business strategy
on their own, abide by the laws in the country where
the enterprises operate and international common business practices, improve their management models, and
pursue unity of economic returns and social results.98
Encouraged by the government, some Chinese banks and
companies are taking an interest in corporate social responsibility.99 This becomes particularly relevant as Chinese banks and
companies increasingly interact on a global scale, enter foreign
stock exchanges, and market their products abroad.
In 2007, China Construction Bank was the first stateowned Chinese bank to publish a corporate social responsibility report.100 In the following year, China Development Bank,
ICBC, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of China also
released their first reports.101 In 2008, Industrial Bank became
the first private Chinese bank to adopt the Equator Principles,102
a global standard for environmentally and socially responsible
project finance. Although many banks’ voluntary corporate standards focus on their domestic lending activities, this may soon
expand to overseas lending.

Overseas Lending
Traditionally, Chinese banks and companies have addressed
environmental and social risks only by complying with host countries’ laws and regulations. As companies expand their operations
in countries with weak governance and regulatory capacity, and as
other multilateral institutions improve their own standards, Chinese companies appear to be moving in a similar direction.
Slowly but steadily, environmental and social standards
are emerging for financial institutions’ overseas lending (see
Emerging Standards for Chinese overseas investment Box 2). All
financial institutions now apply the government’s Green Credit
Policy to domestic lending. In 2004, China Export Import Bank
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

developed a short set of environmental guidelines for its overseas lending, and publicly disclosed revised, more robust guidelines in 2008.103 These guidelines require clients to conduct an
environmental and social impact assessment.104 China ExIm
monitors the client’s implementation of the assessment.105
In 2009, the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s think
tank, the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, along
with the non-governmental Global Environmental Institute and
the University of International Business and Economics, completed draft environmental guidelines for Chinese companies
involved in aid and overseas investment.106 Several Chinese
ministries and regulatory bodies are negotiating the guidelines
and may approve them in the coming months.107 The guidelines
would require companies operating overseas to conduct environmental impact assessments, develop mitigation measures,
compensate people for environmental damage, and adhere to
international treaties signed by China and host countries.108 Chinese companies would be required to follow Chinese environmental standards if they were higher than host countries.109
Box 2: Emerging Standards for Chinese Overseas Investment
Date

Description of standards

2004

China Exim Environment Policy110
Three-paragraph policy developed in 2004 but publicly released only in April 2007.

2006

State Council’s Nine Principles on Overseas
Investment111
Developed to “encourage and standardize” companies’ overseas investment. Requires Chinese companies to comply with local laws, design contract
bidding to be transparent, protect labor rights of local
employees, protect the environment, and implement
corporate responsibilities.

2007

China Export Import Bank’s Environmental
Guidelines112
Publicly released in 2008. Governs investments
overseas. Requires companies to conduct an environmental impact assessment and to compensate communities for environmental damage.

2007

Guide on Sustainable Overseas Silviculture by
Chinese Enterprises113
Governs the overseas practices of Chinese logging
companies. Requires preservation of high value forests and endangered species, monitoring systems,
and consultations with local communities.

2008

SASAC statement on overseas state-owned companies114
The Director of State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (which governs stateowned companies) stated that Chinese companies
going abroad must comply with international rules
and local laws.
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2008

State Council regulations on international
contracts115
A State Council regulation allows the government to
fine companies up to RMB one million for undertaking contracts without official approval. This regulation improves government supervision, protects the
rights of Chinese workers, and enhances compliance
with host country laws.

2008

National Audit Office’s new department on overseas assets116
The office announced a new department focusing on
state-owned or central-capital controlled companies
and overseas national assets. The department will
seek to uncover any potential misuse of funds, with
special attention to overseas state owned assets.

2009

Draft environmental guidelines for overseas
investment117
The Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning,
in cooperation with the Global Environmental Institute and the University of International Business and
Economics, completed draft guidelines. The Ministry
of Environmental Protection and China Banking
Regulatory Commission are negotiating the final
guidelines.

Conclusion
As Chinese banks and companies continue to expand their
overseas footprint, they will undertake more projects in environmentally and socially sensitive areas. The Chinese government’s current efforts to develop standards are an important first
step, but other changes will need to follow. As Western financial
institutions have experienced, policies on paper are meaningless
unless they change the behavior of companies abroad.
Numerous challenges remain. The implementation of any
guidelines will need buy-in and coordination across the numerous Chinese agencies involved in overseas investment. Financial
institutions will also begin to explore ways to enforce and hold
companies accountable for their environmental and social performance. Chinese companies have little experience in engaging
directly with local communities and civil society organizations,
even though direct engagement is the pillar of environmental
and human rights risk management.
Chinese banks and companies can learn from foreign companies by engaging in dialogue and trading experiences, but this
will not be enough. Ultimately, a uniquely Chinese approach
will need to develop to environmental and social risk management that is appropriate for Chinese culture, but also fully
respects the environment and human rights of local communities. In this way, the Chinese development model can truly help
to bring “mutual benefit” and “win-win” development to other
developing countries.
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